Surge 2015 - Lightning Talks

Perhaps the talk[1] given by Bryan Cantrill in 2015, and mentioned in footnote 1 of the article, may have alerted someone to the possibility that there might be something exploitable here? In addition, any of the other online discussions of madvise(,,MADV_DONTNEED), mentioned in that talk, may have attracted someone's interest. This exploit seems to lie at the intersection of several things that I guess might indicate a higher-than-average risk of exploitability: shared memory, special provisions for debugging access to running processes, complicated and unintuitive (if not broken) semantics, and concurrency. [1] [this video]

From the paper. > and subsequently allow the kernel to immediately reuse the associated physical memory. On Linux, this can be achieved by passing the MADV_DONTNEED flag to the the madvise system call. Shouldn't this be MADV_FREE? This instantly reminded me of this classic Bryan Cantrill talk [this video] Edit: It seems that the Linux behavior is relied upon? From later in the paper. > Note that it is even legal for a page to be unloaded while the page con-tent is being read optimistically. This is possible since the virtual memory region reserved for a buffer frame always remains valid (see above), and read accesses to a memory region that was marked with the MADV_DONTNEED flag simply result in zero bytes. No additional physical memory is allocated in this case, as all such accesses are mapped to the same zero page